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NO. 12 FEBRUARY 2021 Introduction 
The EU after Brexit: Renewed Debate 
about Enlargement and Deepening 
Barbara Lippert 
The departure of the United Kingdom and the prospect of an independent Scotland 
seeking membership raise fundamental questions concerning the European Union’s 
future size, geography and polity. Germany’s policy on Europe is traditionally guided 
by the idea that enlargement and deepening are two sides of the same coin. In reality 
progress on integration has never matched the pace of (eastern) enlargement. The road 
to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty was rough, and the spectre of failure haunts any discussion 
of deeper reforms, especially those requiring changes to the treaties by unanimity. The 
Scottish question has the potential to energise enlargement policy and spur internal 
reforms – to prepare not just for a new 28th member, but for an EU-34. 
 
The EU defines itself as an open community 
of European states, and is predisposed to 
enlargement by its treaties (Art. 49 TEU), 
history (seven enlargement rounds) and 
political ambition (Global Strategy). Yet the 
consensus over enlargement is crumbling, 
in certain capitals more than in others. In 
terms of public opinion, consistent major-
ities opposing further enlargement are 
found in Finland, France, the Netherlands 
and Germany. 
The EU’s “renewed consensus on enlarge-
ment” of 2006 emerged in the context 
of the expedited accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania in 2007. Three principles under-
pin the enlargement policy (the “three Cs”). 
Firstly, it seeks geographical consolidation, 
in the sense of avoiding new political com-
mitments to European non-candidate coun-
tries. This message is directed above all to 
the states of the Eastern Partnership. Sec-
ondly, it emphasises strict conditionality: 
the Copenhagen criteria must be fulfilled, 
with no future concessions on readiness. 
Thirdly, it proposes improving communica-
tion to shore up public support. The three 
Cs have lost none of their relevance since 
then. Although the EU revised its accession 
process in 2020, at French instigation, con-
tradictory positions and priorities persist 
among the twenty-seven member states. The 
contrasts are rooted less in aspects of enlarge-
ment policy than in the dissens over EU’s 
strategic orientation and integration capacity. 
Current and Future Applicants 
None of the six Western Balkan applicants 
are anywhere near ready to join. Monte-
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negro has opened the most accession chap-
ters, followed by Serbia. Talks with North 
Macedonia and Albania are upcoming. Bos-
nia and Herzegovina is stuck in the status 
of potential candidate, as is Kosovo – which 
is not even recognised by five EU member 
states. For none of the six is the ultimate 
destination of membership in doubt. But 
all of them are trapped in a vicious circle 
of poor governance and socio-economic 
malaise. As was the case in earlier pre-acces-
sion processes, these countries are already 
strongly integrated in the EU through 
mobility of people and trade. But as third 
states they lack a seat and vote in EU insti-
tutions. Having declined to pursue interim 
solutions or alternatives to full member-
ship for the Western Balkans, the EU has 
cemented its own dependency on the en-
largement path. Accessions cannot be ex-
pected before 2030. Security and geopolitics 
are the prime motives for the EU to accept 
the Western Balkan states at some point, 
with the accession perspective seen as an 
instrument of pacification, to ease or even 
resolve intra- and inter-state conflicts. 
Binding the Balkan states to both the EU 
and NATO is also seen as a means of secur-
ing the West’s influence against Russia, and 
also China and Turkey. But these arguments 
only become real to the public when large 
numbers of refugees start arriving via the 
Balkan route. 
Accession talks with Turkey – which 
began in 2005 – are on ice but not offi-
cially abandoned. The EU finds itself in dire 
need of alternatives, in light of Turkey’s 
slide into presidential authoritarianism and 
the militarisation of its foreign policy. Even 
if President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insists 
on Turkey’s right to join, the EU’s positive 
agenda of December 2020 indicates the 
emergence of a different framework: a com-
prehensive partnership based on expansion 
of the customs union (and the existing asso-
ciation arrangement). Never before has the 
EU terminated accession talks because it 
no longer felt the candidate fitted into the 
Union. Iceland ended talks and withdrew 
its membership application in 2013, while 
Norway voted to reject a negotiated acces-
sion treaty in 1994 – but either could 
choose to change their mind. 
Scotland in the Fast Lane 
The Scottish government has declared its 
intention to apply for EU membership as 
soon as it has achieved independence, 
extending the list of potential candidates. 
While the EU has no interest in a fragmen-
tation of the United Kingdom, it insists 
that any Scottish independence process be 
orderly, constitutional and agreed with 
Westminster. That could put an independ-
ent Scotland in the fast lane to becoming 
the EU’s new 28th member.  
Scottish accession is certainly an attrac-
tive prospect, as the country already largely 
fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, like Austria, 
Finland and Sweden in the so-called EFTA 
enlargement of 1995. And given that a 
majority of Scots voted against Brexit, they 
can expect goodwill in the EU. Scottish First 
Minister Nicola Sturgeon cultivates a narra-
tive of “rejoining the EU” and “coming home”. 
But she cannot expect the EU to feel a 
political or moral obligation to treat Scot-
land as a special case. 
Scotland would have to complete the 
normal accession process under Article 49 
of the Treaty on European Union, facing 
the EU with at least two new challenges. 
The first of these would be the triangular 
constellation between Brussels, London and 
Edinburgh. While Scotland prepares for in-
dependence, the EU is seeking to make its 
reconfigured partnership with the United 
Kingdom as extensive and substantial as 
possible. The bilateral free trade agreement 
of 2020 is just the starting point. In all 
phases of the process – before and after 
Scottish independence and before and after 
Scotland joins the EU – Brussels will want 
to shield its relations with London from 
negative repercussions. Without getting 
dragged into separation talks between Lon-
don and Edinburgh, the EU will want to 
signalise that the conditions under which 
Scotland leaves the United Kingdom will 
need to be compatible with its future EU 
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membership obligations. Scotland is in the 
weakest position because it wants some-
thing from London and (later) from Brus-
sels. Before entering talks the EU will need 
to know that there are no outstanding loose 
ends or points of serious contention be-
tween London and Edinburgh. The earlier 
the talks begin the shorter and simpler they 
will be – while Scotland still remains 
largely in line with the EU’s acquis. Taking 
Finland as a precedent, the process could 
be expected to take three or four years if it 
went well. 
The EU would also find itself dealing 
with a second challenge. Even if it adhered 
to the principle that new members must 
accept the acquis in full, with no perma-
nent opt-outs, transitional arrangements 
would certainly be required in core areas: 
for Schengen, because Scotland wishes to 
remain in the Common Travel Area with 
Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom; 
for trade with England and Wales; and for 
participation in all stages of the monetary 
union, given that an independent Scotland 
would (at least initially) possess no currency 
of its own. If the EU made special conces-
sions here, it would encourage further 
policy-specific internal differentiation, but 
it will certainly prevent candidates cherry-
picking from the acquis. 
The EU should assume that an independ-
ent and internationally recognised Scotland 
will apply for membership by about 2025. 
If this revives political interest in enlarge-
ment, the countries of the Western Balkans 
stand to benefit indirectly. 
Integration Dynamics and 
an EU-34 
The “fourth” Copenhagen criterion under-
lines the importance of maintaining the 
momentum of European integration. Dur-
ing the 2020 spat over opening accession 
talks with Skopje and Tirana, French Pres-
ident Emmanuel Macron insisted that 
reforms must be instituted before the next 
enlargement. But his wake-up call fell on 
deaf ears. Of course an undefined enlarge-
ment timetable invites procrastination. 
But above all the EU has no compass for 
reforms and shies real controversy, for ex-
ample over a core Europe. 
It is obvious that decision-making will be 
even more difficult in a context of thirty-
four or more member states. Economic and 
regional disparities will widen, with a grow-
ing number of net recipients. But the ability 
to secure political accommodation will fail 
to keep pace with the increasing need for 
redistributive mechanisms. Every enlarge-
ment since 1995 has increased the number 
of member states that prioritise national 
sovereignty over steps for further integra-
tion. The strong EU-sceptical and national-
ist currents they contend with domestically 
curtail their scope to compromise in the 
Council and European Council. National 
political cultures also play a significant role. 
An EU-34 implies the accession of a string 
of relatively small countries. The combined 
population of Scotland (5.4 million) and 
the six Western Balkan countries is 23.2 mil-
lion, which would represent just 4.9 per-
cent of the total population of the EU-34. 
The four largest countries – France, Ger-
many, Italy and Spain – account for 54.7 
percent, with Poland 62.8 percent. Turkey, 
with a population of 82 million (as of 2019), 
is in a quite different league, and is not dis-
cussed further here. The European Parlia-
ment has reserved 46 seats for new mem-
bers. Under current rules, Scotland alone 
would be entitled to 14. So the upper limit 
of 751 seats cannot be maintained in an 
EU-34. Despite their relatively small formal 
weight, the new members would exercise 
real influence through active policy and 
coalition-building, and – where the rules 
permit – by their vetoes. The Union’s in-
ternal and external geography will change 
too. The accession of the Western Balkan 
states would increase the weight of the EU’s 
south-east, with Scotland supplying only a 
marginal counterweight in the north. The 
latter would strengthen the Nordics, be-
cause Scotland, the Scandinavian countries 
and the Baltics are natural partners (espe-
cially if Scotland joins NATO). The Western 
Balkans are already surrounded by EU 
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member states, and can be expected to 
gravitate towards the Visegrád states, 
Austria, Croatia and Slovenia. In the 
Western Balkans, accession will not allay 
concerns over the resilience and stability 
of the EU’s south-eastern flank in the way 
it did in the Baltics. While the scope for 
enlargement in western Europe is minimal, 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are all seek-
ing a membership perspective. The often 
underestimated geopolitical implications 
of enlargement are bubbling to the surface. 
The Future of the EU 
Enlargement will not improve the prospects 
of strengthening the EU’s supranational ele-
ments. Differentiation and hierarchisation 
in the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
is conceivable, for example through a EU 
Security Council (see SWP Research Paper 
4/2019). In its core policies the EU could 
experiment with partial and/or junior mem-
bership, especially with respect to the next 
(south-)eastern enlargement. No new EU 
member (except conceivably Norway) would 
be in a position to immediately become a 
full member of Schengen, and none will 
quickly adopt the euro. De facto deepening 
will continue without treaty amendments, 
in small groups with weak ties to the others. 
If differentiation is the future, the centre 
needs to be strengthened to hold the Union 
together. To name just one starting point: 
The reduction in the size of the Commis-
sion required under the Treaty of Lisbon 
could enhance the effectiveness of its work 
on progressive policies like digitalisation 
and the Green Deal, as well as its role in 
guarding the Union’s external borders. But 
a further politicisation of the Commission, 
whether by direct election of the president 
or by the “lead candidate” model, would be 
detrimental to the cohesion of the EU-34. 
Other constitutional questions relate to a 
single electoral law for the European Parlia-
ment, reform of the Council system, more 
majority decisions in the Council and Euro-
pean Council, collective borrowing, and 
economic policy coordination in the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union. The EU also 
needs to clarify its foundational values. 
Otherwise even makeshift arrangements – 
like the new rule of law mechanism – will 
be futile. These issues belong – in the per-
spective of an EU-34 – on the agenda of the 
Conference on the Future of Europe. The 
next German government should resume 
a more active role in shaping the debate 
about the strategic orientation of the EU. 
Dr. Barbara Lippert is Director of Research and member of the Executive Board at SWP. 
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